Dom Watts founded the Ministry of Injustice in July 2021. Dom is an IT Professional with 30+ years experience in Tier 1 Banking, Government, Defence, Healthcare and Global Blue Chips. Dom has no legal training and is not a lawyer but has previously consulted for a Magic Circle Law Firm. You can find Dom on X or Google.
Section 4a of The Limitation Act 1980 defines the time limit for actions for defamation or malicious falsehood as one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
Article 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 gives the right to freedom of expression. "This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers."
“A key issue here is the need to distinguish between conduct which, however objectionable, does not justify invoking the criminal law and conduct which crosses the line and results in criminal liability" - Para 31 R v O’Neill [2016] EWCA Crim 92 [2016]
“Harassment is generally understood to involve improper oppressive and unreasonable conduct that is targeted at an individual and calculated to produce alarm and distress” - Para 38 R v O’Neill [2016] EWCA Crim 92 [2016]
"The behaviour said to amount to harassment must reach a level of seriousness passing beyond irritations, annoyances....The gravity of the misconduct must be of an order which would sustain criminal liability" - Paras [40-44] Hayden v Dickenson [2020] EWHC 3291 (QB)
"If you tell the truth, you don't have to remember anything"
In 2002 Dom Watts was an unlikely consumer champion. The dad of three from Croydon took on the power and might of Kodak – and won...Dom on BBC Working Lunch
He was previously Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs between 5 July 2024 and 5 September 2025. David was first elected as Labour MP for Tottenham at the age of 27 in June 2000.
Oversight of all portfolios and Ministry of Justice strategy
Oversight of departmental COVID-19 response supported by other ministers according to portfolio
Oversight of international business and future relations with the EU
MoJ support for the Union
Resourcing of the department
Functions of the Lord Chancellor
Judicial policy including pay, pensions and diversity (these and other operational decisions affecting the judiciary are reserved to the Lord Chancellor)
Corporate services
Previous Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice
David Lammy the Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary, has made several critical statements about US President Donald Trump in the past, particularly when he was a backbench MP.
In 2018, Lammy wrote in a TIME magazine article that Trump was a “woman-hating, neo-Nazi-sympathising sociopath” and a “profound threat to the international order.” He also called Trump a “tyrant in a toupee” and vowed to protest against the UK government’s “capitulation” to Trump during his visit to the UK.
In 2017, Lammy tweeted that Trump was a “racist KKK and Nazi sympathiser” and pledged to protest on the streets if Trump visited the UK.
In 2019, responding to Trump’s claim that he had been treated badly as president, Lammy tweeted, “4 US Presidents have been assassinated snowflake,” a comment criticized for its tone.
In the United Kingdom, judicial titles such as “His Honour,” “Her Honour,” or “Lord/Lady Justice” carry significant prestige, reflecting the authority and responsibility of judges during their tenure.
But what happens to these titles after retirement? Do retired judges, from circuit judges to High Court judges and beyond retain their honorifics?
Judicial titles in the UK vary by court level. Circuit judges, appointed under the Courts Act 1971, are addressed as “Your Honour” in court and styled “His Honour Judge [Surname]” or “Her Honour Judge [Surname]” (with KC added if applicable).
High Court judges, also under the Courts Act 1971, are addressed as “My Lord” or “My Lady” and styled “The Honourable Mr/Mrs Justice [Surname].” Court of Appeal judges, often referred to as Lords or Ladies Justices, carry the title “Lord/Lady Justice [Surname].” Supreme Court Justices are styled “Lord/Lady [Surname]” and addressed as “My Lord/Lady.”
Judges such as Deputy District Judges and Tribunal Judges are referred to as “Judge”.
Magistrates are referred to as “Your Worship, or Sir or Madam”
The ICLR and Judiciary guidance confirm these conventions for active judges, with correspondence typically beginning “Dear Judge” or “Dear Sir/Madam” depending on the role.
Post-Retirement Title Usage
Upon retirement, judges cease to hold their judicial office, raising questions about title retention. The answer varies by judicial level and context, formal legal settings, professional correspondence or social interactions.
Formal Legal Contexts
Legally, judicial titles are tied to the office held. The Courts Act 1971 and Senior Courts Act 1981 establish judicial roles but do not address post-retirement titles.
The Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act 2022 allows retired judges, including circuit, High Court, and Court of Appeal judges, to be recalled for “sitting in retirement” roles, such as deputy circuit or High Court judges.
When serving in these capacities, they are addressed with their former titles in court (e.g., “Your Honour” for circuit judges, “My Lord/Lady” for High Court judges). Outside such roles, retired judges do not officially retain their titles in formal legal proceedings. Using titles like “His Honour” or “Mr Justice” in court documents for non-serving retired judges may be inappropriate.
Professional and Social Contexts
In practice, retired judges are often addressed with their former titles as a courtesy.
The ICLR guidance notes that retired circuit judges may be styled “His Honour [Full Name]” in correspondence, with letters beginning “Dear Judge.” Similarly, retired High Court judges may be addressed as “Sir [First Name]” or “Dame [First Name]” if knighted or appointed DBE, or simply “Mr/Mrs Justice [Surname] (Retired).” Retired Court of Appeal or Supreme Court judges often retain “Lord/Lady [Surname]” due to peerages, which are lifelong.
The Judiciary’s guidance does not prohibit these practices, suggesting flexibility in non-judicial settings. For example, a retired judge speaking at a legal event might be introduced with their former title, such as “Her Honour Judge [Surname] (Retired)” or “Lord Justice [Surname] (Retired).”
Practical Examples
Consider His Honour Judge Melbourne Inman KC, a retired circuit judge often referenced with his title in professional contexts, suggesting its use post-retirement as a courtesy.
Retired High Court judges, like Sir John Mummery, are frequently styled “Sir John” or “Mr Justice Mummery (Retired)” in legal publications. Lord Dyson, a former Supreme Court Justice, retains his title due to his peerage, as seen in public appearances.
Retired judges serving as arbitrators or mediators, common roles post-retirement are often introduced with their former titles in professional settings.
Conventions and Nuances
Title retention is largely customary. In legal and professional circles, using “His Honour,” “Mr Justice,” or “Lord/Lady” for retired judges is common, particularly in correspondence or when referencing their judicial contributions.
Peerages, like those for Supreme Court or Court of Appeal judges, are retained for life, ensuring continued use of “Lord/Lady.”
The Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993, which governs judicial pensions, does not address titles but reinforces the retirement age of 75, after which judges may serve in limited capacities.
Conclusion
Retired UK judges do not officially retain their titles in formal legal contexts unless recalled to judicial roles under the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act 2022.
However, conventions outlined by the ICLR and Judiciary allow titles like “His Honour,” “Mr Justice,” or “Lord/Lady” to be used as a courtesy in professional and social settings. This practice reflects respect for their service, with variations by judicial level and context. For formal situations, clarity on a judge’s status is essential to ensure accuracy.
Domain squatting, commonly referred to as cybersquatting, is the act of registering, trafficking or using an internet domain name with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with a trademark, brand, or name belonging to another entity.
In the UK, where businesses, organisations, government departments and individuals increasingly depend on their online presence, domain squatting poses significant legal, ethical, and commercial challenges. It can undermine brand integrity, confuses consumers, and threatens the trustworthiness of the digital marketplace.
Addressing this issue requires a robust combination of legal frameworks, industry mechanisms, and proactive strategies, including guidance from authoritative sources such as the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).
The National Cyber Security Centre, a part of GCHQ, helps businesses, the public sector and individuals protect the online services and devices that we all depend on.
The mechanics of domain squatting are deceptively simple yet highly damaging. Squatters target well-known brands, public figures, or trending terms, registering domain names that closely resemble or incorporate these names. For example, a squatter might secure “brandnameuk.com” or a misspelled variant like “bradnname.com” before the legitimate owner can claim it.
Their objectives typically include selling the domain to the rightful owner at an exorbitant price, redirecting traffic to competing websites, or hosting misleading content to generate advertising revenue.
A related tactic, typosquatting, exploits common typing errors to divert users from their intended destinations, further eroding trust in online navigation. These practices not only harm brand owners but also create confusion and potential financial loss for consumers who may encounter fraudulent or misleading websites.
Legal and Industry Mechanisms in the UK
In the UK, domain squatting is addressed through a combination of legal and industry mechanisms designed to protect brand owners.
For .uk domains, the Nominet Dispute Resolution Service (DRS) offers a specialized, efficient process tailored to the .uk namespace. The DRS allows brand owners to resolve disputes by proving abusive registration or bad-faith use, making it a cornerstone of domain protection in the UK. Beyond these mechanisms, UK law provides additional recourse.
The Trade Marks Act 1994 enables trademark holders to pursue legal action against domains that infringe on their registered marks. The tort of “passing off” can also apply when a squatter’s actions mislead consumers into believing the domain is associated with the legitimate brand, causing reputational or financial harm. High-profile cases, such as those involving major brands like Marks & Spencer or Premier League football clubs, illustrate the courts’ commitment to protecting brand owners from cybersquatting.
The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), established by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), provides a global framework for trademark owners to challenge bad-faith domain registrations. To succeed under the UDRP, complainants must demonstrate that the domain is identical or confusingly similar to their trademark, that the registrant has no legitimate interest in the domain, and that it was registered or used in bad faith.
Government Guidance on Defensive Domain Registration
The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) security guidance on Defensive domain registrations emphasises defensive domain registration as a proactive strategy to combat cybersquatting. This approach involves registering multiple domain variations, including common misspellings, alternative extensions (e.g., .co.uk, .uk), and related terms, to prevent squatters from acquiring them.
The guidance advises securing domains early in the branding process, particularly for organisations with valuable intellectual property or high public visibility. It also recommends ongoing monitoring of domain registrations to detect suspicious activity, enabling swift action through Nominet’s DRS or legal channels. This proactive stance is critical for businesses seeking to safeguard their online presence and avoid costly disputes.
Some domain registrars have methods to detect malicious registrations of overtly government-associated domains through the use of misspellings and so on.
Unless there are strong justifications as to why misspellings must be covered, organisations should only defensively register .uk and .co.uk top-level domain variants and visual manipulations.
For example, the removal of one dot from justice.gov.uk leads to justicegov.uk which could be a registerable domain and one that looks a lot like justice.gov.uk during a casual inspection.
The ethical debate surrounding domain squatting is complex. Squatters often argue they are engaging in legitimate entrepreneurial activity by securing available digital assets in an open market.
However, their actions frequently exploit brand goodwill, mislead consumers, and undermine trust in the online ecosystem. Small businesses, in particular, are vulnerable, as they may lack the resources to pursue expensive legal battles or pay exorbitant fees to reclaim domains.
The financial and reputational damage caused by squatters can be significant, particularly when consumers encounter fraudulent websites or lose trust in a brand’s online presence.
Proactive Prevention and Solutions
Preventing domain squatting requires a multifaceted approach. Defensive domain registration, as recommended by cyber security professionals, is a critical first step. Businesses should also leverage monitoring services to track new registrations that may infringe on their brand.
Nominet’s DRS and other registry tools facilitate rapid detection and resolution of disputes, while legal action can reclaim hijacked domains when necessary.
However, prevention remains the most effective strategy. Public awareness, robust enforcement by Nominet, and adherence to government guidance play vital roles in mitigating the risks of cybersquatting.
Thank you for registering the domain name sisgov.uk. We are writing to let you know that this domain has been temporarily deactivated and what you can do to reactivate it. You should be able to find all the information you need below but if you need any help, please contact our Customer Support team on 0330 236 9477.
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The case serves as a stark reminder of the boundaries of lawful surveillance and the necessity of proper disclosure in criminal proceedings.
Background of the Case
The case involved Robert Sutherland and four co-defendants, charged with murder and conspiracy to murder following a fatal incident in the Midlands.
The prosecution’s case hinged on evidence obtained through covert surveillance, including audio recordings made at Grantham and Sleaford police stations.
However, it was revealed that the police had secretly recorded privileged conversations between the defendants and their legal advisors, violating the defendants’ right to confidential legal consultation.
This misconduct led to an application to stay the proceedings on the grounds of abuse of process, arguing that the surveillance had fatally undermined the trial’s fairness.
The High Court judge agreed, ruling that the police had “made a mockery of the police caution” and “undermined the statutory right of a defendant to confer with a solicitor in private.” As a result, the case was dismissed, and all defendants were acquitted.
Impact on Disclosure Obligations
R v Sutherland & Others [2002] significantly clarified disclosure obligations under the CPIA 1996. The Act requires the prosecution to disclose all material that might undermine their case or assist the defence.
The case established that even non-incriminating surveillance evidence, such as recordings yielding no useful evidence, must be disclosed. The court emphasised that the existence of surveillance itself is material, as it may support defence arguments questioning the investigation’s thoroughness or integrity.
For example, extensive surveillance producing no incriminating results could strengthen a claim of innocence. This ruling has shaped how prosecution teams manage evidence, stressing meticulous record-keeping and transparency to ensure fairness.
Implications for Surveillance Practices
The case also exposed serious issues with police surveillance under RIPA 2000, which governs covert investigative techniques.
The unauthorised recording of privileged communications breached RIPA’s requirements for lawful, proportionate, and authorised surveillance.
The court’s strong condemnation highlighted the risks of overreach in surveillance operations and their potential to derail prosecutions.
This aspect of the case has led to increased scrutiny of police practices and reinforced the importance of independent oversight, such as by Surveillance Commissioners, to ensure compliance with RIPA.
Directed Surveillance Authority under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) provides the legal framework for authorising directed surveillance in the UK, which involves covert monitoring of individuals’ activities in non-intrusive settings, such as public places, to gather intelligence for investigations.
Directed Surveillance Authority (DSA) under RIPA requires that such operations be necessary, proportionate, and approved by a designated senior officer within a public authority, such as the police or intelligence services.
The DSA ensures compliance with strict criteria to prevent abuse, safeguarding individuals’ privacy while enabling lawful investigations. Oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO) ensures adherence to RIPA’s guidelines, with failures to comply, as seen in cases like R v Sutherland & Others [2002], potentially leading to evidence being deemed inadmissible and undermining prosecutions.
As per the requirements of R v SUTHERLAND, if the task has a RIPA / DSA authorisation, NPAS will require a full copy of the DSA authorisation detailing exactly what is (and isn’t) authorised and the means by which it can be obtained, details of the authorising officer, date authorised and the review / expiry dates before that tasking can be actioned.
The collapse of the trial raised concerns about public confidence in the criminal justice system. The acquittal, while legally justified, left the victim’s family feeling “completely let down,” underscoring the human cost of investigative failures.
The case has been widely cited in discussions about the ethical limits of covert operations and the need for robust training for law enforcement.
The Signature Brand have integrated the case into training on disclosure and covert tactics, highlighting its practical implications. For defence lawyers, it provides a powerful tool to challenge prosecution cases by scrutinising disclosure completeness, particularly in surveillance-heavy cases.
Conclusion
R v Sutherland & Others [2002] remains a cornerstone of UK case law, reinforcing the principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability in criminal proceedings.
Its legacy continues to influence how surveillance evidence and disclosure are handled, ensuring defendants’ rights are protected while upholding judicial integrity. The case serves as a cautionary tale that procedural missteps, even if well-intentioned, can have profound consequences, highlighting the delicate balance between effective policing and adherence to the rule of law.
In criminal law an abuse of process occurs when the criminal justice system is misused in a way that undermines fairness, justice or the integrity of legal proceedings.
It involves actions that exploit the judicial process for improper purposes, such as harassing a defendant, causing unjust delays, or pursuing a case without legitimate grounds.
The concept is enshrined in the court’s inherent jurisdiction to protect its processes, as guided by the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020(CrimPR) and established case law.
Defining Abuse of Process
An abuse of process arises when the prosecution’s conduct or case circumstances render a fair trial impossible or unjust.
CPR Rule 3.28, part of the case management framework, empowers courts to give directions to ensure proceedings are conducted efficiently and fairly, which includes identifying and addressing potential abuses of process.
This rule supports the overriding objective in CPR 1.1 to deal with cases justly, ensuring fairness, efficiency, and compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights and Human Rights Act 1998, particularly Article 6 (right to a fair trial). Examples of abuse of process include:
Improper Motives: Prosecuting to harass or intimidate rather than seek justice.
Unreasonable Delay: Excessive delays that prejudice the defendant’s defence, such as faded memories or lost evidence.
Non-Disclosure: Failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, breaching the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
Entrapment: Inducing a defendant to commit a crime they would not otherwise have committed.
Bad Faith Prosecutions: Pursuing a case without sufficient evidence or for ulterior motives, like political pressure.
Legal Framework
The Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 (CrimPR) are a comprehensive set of rules governing the practice and procedure of criminal courts in England and Wales. They provide a framework to ensure criminal cases are managed justly, efficiently, and fairly, as mandated by the Courts Act 2003, which empowers the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee to make these rules.
CrimPR 1.1, the overriding objective, requires courts to manage cases to avoid unfairness, inefficiency, or prejudice. Unlike specific statutory provisions in other contexts, criminal abuse of process relies on judicial discretion and precedent.
1.1.—(1) The overriding objective of this procedural code is that criminal cases be dealt with justly.
(2) Dealing with a criminal case justly includes―
(a) acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty;
(b) treating all participants with politeness and respect;
(c) dealing with the prosecution and the defence fairly;
(d) recognising the rights of a defendant, particularly those under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights;
(e) respecting the interests of witnesses, victims and jurors and keeping them informed of the progress of the case;
(f) dealing with the case efficiently and expeditiously;
(g) ensuring that appropriate information is available to the court when bail and sentence are considered; and
(h) dealing with the case in ways that take into account―
(i) the gravity of the offence alleged,
(ii) the complexity of what is in issue,
(iii) the severity of the consequences for the defendant and others affected, and
CrimPR 1.2 outlines the duty of all participants in a criminal case to actively assist the court in achieving the overriding objective.
1.2.—(1) Each participant, in the conduct of each case, must―
(a) prepare and conduct the case in accordance with the overriding objective;
(b) comply with these Rules, practice directions and directions made by the court; and
(c) at once inform the court and all parties of any significant failure (whether or not that participant is responsible for that failure) to take any procedural step required by these Rules, any practice direction or any direction of the court. A failure is significant if it might hinder the court in furthering the overriding objective.
(2) Anyone involved in any way with a criminal case is a participant in its conduct for the purposes of this rule.
CrimPR 3.28 allows courts to give directions for the effective management of criminal cases, which includes addressing abuses of process. While the rule itself focuses on case progression, it enables judges to scrutinise proceedings for potential misuse, ensuring they align with the overriding objective of fairness.
3.28.—(1) This rule applies where a defendant wants the Crown Court to stay the case on the grounds that the proceedings are an abuse of the court, or otherwise unfair.
(2) Such a defendant must—
(a) apply in writing—
(i) as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the grounds for doing so,
(ii) at a pre-trial hearing, unless the grounds for the application do not arise until trial, and
(iii) in any event, before the defendant pleads guilty or the jury (if there is one) retires to consider its verdict at trial;
(b) serve the application on—
(i) the court officer, and
(ii) each other party; and
(c) in the application—
(i) explain the grounds on which it is made,
(ii) include, attach or identify all supporting material,
(iii) specify relevant events, dates and propositions of law, and
(iv) identify any witness the applicant wants to call to give evidence in person.
(3) A party who wants to make representations in response to the application must serve the representations on—
(a) the court officer; and
(b) each other party,
not more than 10 business days after service of the application.
Unlike specific statutory provisions in other contexts, criminal abuse of process relies on judicial discretion, with Rule 3.28 facilitating proactive case management to prevent or remedy abuses. Courts assess whether continuing a case would undermine public confidence or violate defendants’ rights.
Judicial Response
Courts have broad powers to address abuse of process, including:
Staying Proceedings: Halting a case if a fair trial is impossible or unjust, as supported by CrimPR Rule 3.28 directions.
Dismissing Charges: Dropping charges due to prosecutorial misconduct.
For instance, in R v Beckford [1996] 1 Cr App R 94, non-disclosure of evidence was deemed an abuse, prompting judicial intervention. Similarly, R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48 clarified that remedies depend on the abuse’s severity and impact on fairness.
Importance of Preventing Abuse of Process
Preventing abuse of process, as facilitated by CrimPR Rule 3.28, is vital to maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system. It protects defendants from oppressive treatment, ensures efficient use of court resources, and upholds the integrity of proceedings.
A McKenzie Friend can provide moral support, take notes, help organise case papers, and offer quiet advice on the conduct of the case. They do not have an automatic right to act as an advocate, conduct litigation, or address the court.
In criminal proceedings, McKenzie Friends generally do not have a right of audience. This means they cannot speak on behalf of the litigant, make oral submissions or examine witnesses unless the court explicitly grants permission.
The court may grant a right of audience in exceptional circumstances, but this is rare. The decision is at the discretion of the presiding magistrate or judge, guided by the interests of justice.
Examples of exceptional circumstances may include:
The litigant has health issues preventing them from effectively addressing the court.
The litigant lacks the ability to articulate their case (e.g., due to language barriers or intellectual limitations).
The complexity of the case requires assistance to ensure a fair hearing.
Courts in criminal cases are more cautious about granting rights of audience due to the serious nature of criminal proceedings, which involve public interest and potential penalties like imprisonment.
The Legal Services Act 2007 (sections 12–19 and Schedule 3) makes it a criminal offense for an unqualified person to exercise rights of audience or conduct litigation unless authorised by the court on a case-by-case basis.
Court’s Discretion and Restrictions
A litigant must request permission for a McKenzie Friend to have a right of audience at the start of the hearing. The court will consider factors such as:
The litigant’s ability to represent themselves.
The complexity of the legal issues.
Whether the McKenzie Friend’s involvement would impede the administration of justice.
The court may refuse or revoke permission if the McKenzie Friend disrupts proceedings, acts improperly, or breaches confidentiality.
The court may also require the McKenzie Friend to provide their name, contact details, and a statement confirming they understand their role and duties, including confidentiality.
Court Denying a McKenzie Friend the Right of Audience
A judge is expected to provide reasons when denying a McKenzie friend the right of audience (permission to speak on behalf of a litigant in person).
This aligns with principles of fairness and transparency under Legal Services Act 2007 (c. 29), specifically under sections 208, 210, 211, Schedule 21 paragraph 84(d), and Schedule 23, which gives courts discretion to grant such rights only for “good reason,” typically in exceptional circumstances.
In magistrates’ courts, where proceedings are often faster-paced and less formal than in higher courts, magistrates may be more reluctant to allow a McKenzie Friend to speak, as the litigant is normally expected to represent themselves.
If a McKenzie Friend is granted a right of audience, their role is still limited to specific tasks (e.g., addressing a point of law or cross-examining a witness) rather than acting as a full advocate throughout the hearing.
Fee-charging McKenzie Friends are viewed with caution, and courts may scrutinise their involvement to ensure they are not acting as unqualified legal representatives.
The Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 do not specifically address McKenzie Friends but emphasise the court’s overriding objective to deal with cases justly, which includes ensuring a fair hearing for unrepresented defendants.
Clarkson v Gilbert [2000] 2 FLR 839: Clarified that the court has unfettered discretion to grant a right of audience, and such decisions should not be limited to “exceptional” circumstances but depend on the case’s specifics.
McKenzie Friends are not regulated like solicitors or barristers, so there is no guarantee of their competence or accountability. Courts may exclude a McKenzie Friend if they undermine the efficient administration of justice (e.g., by providing improper advice or disrupting proceedings).
Litigants using a McKenzie Friend cannot recover costs for their services from the opposing party, even if successful, as costs are limited to those of a litigant in person.
The case is particularly relevant to litigants in person who seek assistance from unqualified individuals to represent them in court proceedings, including in criminal, civil, or family matters.
Factual and Procedural Background
Parties and Context: The claimant, Petruska Clarkson, a psychotherapist, initiated legal proceedings against multiple defendants (also psychotherapists) alleging conspiracy, inducement to breach contract, and libel. These claims arose after her suspension from the Gestalt Psychotherapy Training Institute.
McKenzie Friend: Clarkson’s husband, Vincent Keter, who had a law degree and had completed Bar finals but was not yet called to the Bar, sought to represent her in court. He applied for a right of audience to act as her advocate in the litigation, including at trial and interlocutory hearings.
Initial Order: On 14 May 1999, Morland J granted Keter an ex parte order (without notice to the defendants) allowing him rights of audience under section 27(2)(c) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, citing Clarkson’s ill health (an angina attack and depression) and her lack of financial means to hire legal representation.
Challenge: The defendants applied to set aside Morland J’s order, arguing insufficient evidence (e.g., outdated medical reports) and Keter’s questionable conduct, including misrepresenting himself as an advocate. On 16 December 1999, Eady J set aside the order, prompting Clarkson’s appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Appeal: The Court of Appeal, presided over by Lord Woolf CJ, alongside Waller LJ and Clarke LJ, heard the appeal on 14 June 2000. The key issue was whether Keter, as a close relative and non-lawyer, should be granted a right of audience to represent Clarkson.
Legal Issues
The court addressed the following legal questions:
Whether a close relative, such as a spouse, should be granted a right of audience under section 27(2)(c) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
Whether “exceptional circumstances” are required to grant such rights to an unqualified person, particularly a family member.
The appropriate exercise of judicial discretion in such cases, balancing the interests of justice with the proper administration of the courts.
Court’s Reasoning and Decision: The Court of Appeal allowed Clarkson’s appeal, restoring Morland J’s order granting Keter rights of audience.
Judicial Discretion Under Section 27(2)(c): Section 27(2)(c) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 allows courts to grant a right of audience to a person not otherwise entitled, in relation to specific proceedings, at the court’s discretion.
The court emphasised that this discretion is unfettered but must be exercised in light of the statutory objective in section 17(1) (to develop legal services while maintaining the proper administration of justice) and section 17(3) (general principles governing professional advocates).
Distinction Between Professional and Family Advocates: The court distinguished between unqualified individuals offering advocacy services generally (e.g., professional McKenzie Friends) and close relatives assisting a family member.
For professional McKenzie Friends, the court typically requires exceptional circumstances to grant a right of audience, as established in D v S (Rights of Audience) [1997] 1 FLR 724. This is because such individuals may lack professional regulation and accountability. For close relatives, such as a spouse, the test is less stringent.
The court held that the question is whether there is good reason to grant the right of audience, based on the specific circumstances of the case, rather than requiring exceptional circumstances.
Factors Justifying a Right of Audience: Lord Woolf CJ noted that the overriding objective is to ensure justice is done. With legal aid less readily available, litigants in person may need assistance to present their case effectively.
Relevant factors include the litigant’s health (e.g., Clarkson’s angina and depression) and financial means (e.g., inability to afford legal representation after unsuccessful attempts to secure conditional fee arrangements or pro bono assistance).
In this case, the court found that Clarkson’s health issues and lack of means justified allowing Keter to act as her advocate, as there was a risk she would be deprived of a fair hearing otherwise.
Critique of the Lower Court: The court held that Eady J erred by applying the “exceptional circumstances” test from D v S to a case involving a close relative.
Clarke LJ clarified that the discretion under section 27(2)(c) is not fettered by a requirement for exceptional circumstances in such cases. Instead, the court must consider whether it is just to permit the advocate, based on the case’s facts.
Practical Considerations: The court acknowledged that litigants in person have a right to conduct their own litigation but may need assistance due to practical difficulties. A McKenzie Friend’s role (e.g., giving advice or taking notes) does not automatically extend to advocacy unless the court grants permission.
The court noted concerns about Keter’s conduct (e.g., describing himself as an advocate) but found these insufficient to deny the right of audience, given the need to ensure justice for Clarkson.
The court emphasised that the litigant should generally apply in person for such permission at the start of the hearing, allowing the court to assess the need directly.
Statutory Framework: The court highlighted the tension between allowing a close relative to act as an advocate and the statutory duties under section 27(2A) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, which require advocates to act with independence and comply with professional conduct rules. A family member may struggle to maintain such independence, but this did not preclude granting the right in this case.
Holding and Implications: The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, restoring Keter’s right of audience to represent Clarkson in the litigation.
The court found that her ill health and lack of means constituted good reason for granting the right, and the decision was necessary to ensure justice. • Implications: The case clarified that the test for granting a right of audience to a close relative is whether there is good reason, not necessarily exceptional circumstances, distinguishing such cases from those involving professional McKenzie Friends.
It recognised the practical reality of reduced legal aid availability, increasing the need for assistance for litigants in person.
The decision reinforced the court’s discretion to balance the interests of justice with the need to maintain proper administration, particularly in cases where the litigant’s ability to represent themselves is impaired.
The case remains a key authority in determining when McKenzie Friends or relatives may be granted rights of audience, especially in civil and family proceedings, and its principles are often applied analogously in criminal proceedings (though courts are more cautious in criminal cases due to their seriousness).
Conclusion
While Clarkson v Gilbert was a civil case, its principles are relevant to magistrates’ and crown courts in criminal proceedings:
The latest cases in the Crown Court and Court of Appeal are available on the Sky News Courts YouTube channel. These videos are an opportunity to see justice in action.
Section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 (CJA 1925) makes it an offence to take any photograph, make or attempt to make any portrait or sketch of a justice or a witness in, or a party to, any proceedings before the court, either in the courtroom or its precincts.
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Lady Chief Justice gives judgment in the Court of Appeal – Shamima Begum
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Palestine Action ban is lawful, Court of Appeal rules
The government's proscription of Palestine Action as a terror organisation is lawful, the Court of Appeal ruled.
Five of the most senior judges in the country overturned an earlier decision from ...the High Court that the ban had breached the right to protest and had been incorrectly taken by ministers.
The proscription made it a criminal offence to belong to or support Palestine Action, punishable by up to 14 years in prison.
Handing down their ruling, which followed an earlier two-day hearing, the appeal judges said the ban had been "justified and proportionate".
Lady Chief Justice Baroness Carr and four other judges said that the government's policy on banning terrorism groups meant the home secretary had been legally entitled to decide the group should be proscribed.
She said the judges recognised the proscription of an organisation like Palestine Acton was "highly controversial" and that it was supported by "many otherwise lawful citizens".
But Baroness Carr added that it was "a fundamental mistake to overlook the fact that Palestine Action overtly promotes unlawful violence amounting to terrorism".
"It is not - as claimed - a direct action civil disobedience protest group like the suffragettes, operating transparently in the open," she added.
"It is a covert organisation which operates with secret cells to avoid the detection and prosecution of those using violence to destroy property and cause injury."
She said the group had neither disowned nor condemned three incidents which took place before the ban was implemented and were judged by ministers to amount to terrorism.
The threats posed by Palestine Action had been the most important factor in the lawful decision-making, Baroness Carr said, including how the group clandestinely organised and targeted lawful businesses.
That included defence firms involved in UK national defence and assisting Ukraine. The home secretary had been best placed to judge the impact of those threats, said the court.
Ammori had challenged the ban on the argument that the-then Home Secretary Yvette Cooper had not followed her own internal rules - and that the ban also amounted to a serious interference with the right to protest.
The High Court decided the home secretary's policy on bans was designed to limit her discretion - but the government appealed that, saying she had been entitled to take into account the benefits of targeting and curtailing the group with terrorism legislation.
The Court of Appeal agreed, adding that the government was generally better placed than the courts in deciding matters of national security. While the court was the ultimate arbiter, judges had to recognise that ministers must have a wide margin within which to act in this complex field.
Palestine Action ban is lawful, Court of Appeal rules
The government's proscription of Palestine Action as a terror ...
The government's proscription of Palestine Action as a terror organisation is lawful, the Court of Appeal ruled.
Five of the most senior judges in the country overturned an earlier decision from ...the High Court that the ban had breached the right to protest and had been incorrectly taken by ministers.
The proscription made it a criminal offence to belong to or support Palestine Action, punishable by up to 14 years in prison.
Handing down their ruling, which followed an earlier two-day hearing, the appeal judges said the ban had been "justified and proportionate".
Lady Chief Justice Baroness Carr and four other judges said that the government's policy on banning terrorism groups meant the home secretary had been legally entitled to decide the group should be proscribed.
She said the judges recognised the proscription of an organisation like Palestine Acton was "highly controversial" and that it was supported by "many otherwise lawful citizens".
But Baroness Carr added that it was "a fundamental mistake to overlook the fact that Palestine Action overtly promotes unlawful violence amounting to terrorism".
"It is not - as claimed - a direct action civil disobedience protest group like the suffragettes, operating transparently in the open," she added.
"It is a covert organisation which operates with secret cells to avoid the detection and prosecution of those using violence to destroy property and cause injury."
She said the group had neither disowned nor condemned three incidents which took place before the ban was implemented and were judged by ministers to amount to terrorism.
The threats posed by Palestine Action had been the most important factor in the lawful decision-making, Baroness Carr said, including how the group clandestinely organised and targeted lawful businesses.
That included defence firms involved in UK national defence and assisting Ukraine. The home secretary had been best placed to judge the impact of those threats, said the court.
Ammori had challenged the ban on the argument that the-then Home Secretary Yvette Cooper had not followed her own internal rules - and that the ban also amounted to a serious interference with the right to protest.
The High Court decided the home secretary's policy on bans was designed to limit her discretion - but the government appealed that, saying she had been entitled to take into account the benefits of targeting and curtailing the group with terrorism legislation.
The Court of Appeal agreed, adding that the government was generally better placed than the courts in deciding matters of national security. While the court was the ultimate arbiter, judges had to recognise that ministers must have a wide margin within which to act in this complex field.
IN FULL: Palestine Action activists jailed over factory raid
Four Palestine Action activists who caused £1.2m of damage at a UK ...
Four Palestine Action activists who caused £1.2m of damage at a UK site of an Israel-based defence firm were jailed.
Charlotte Head, 30, Samuel Corner, 23, Leona Kamio, 30, and Fatema ...Rajwani, 21, were convicted of criminal damage in a retrial after they broke into the Elbit Systems factory near Bristol in August 2024.
Corner was jailed for seven years and eight months for criminal damage and inflicting grievous bodily harm on a police sergeant.
The judge, Mr Justice Johnson, said Corner had had no justification for the "extreme and gratuitous force" used.
The case is believed to be the first time that convictions for criminal damage have been classified as being connected to terrorism. The judge said their actions had aimed to influence the government.
Head, who drove the prison van into the compound, was sentenced to five years in prison, Kamio was also handed a five-year jail term, and Rajwani received a prison sentence of four years and eight months.
The offenders will not qualify for early release from prison provisions and the Parole Board will assess their risk to the public when it determines when they can be set free.
All four will also serve an additional one year on a licence in the community at the end of their terms.
The judge said two of the activists had livestreamed the raid and posted the footage to social media, as part of an effort to "glorify criminality and vigilantism".
He added that they had been "reckless" about who would be injured and had been heavily involved in organising the raid with the right of veto over each part of the plan.
This video has been edited to remove extreme language.
Jail for Brit who encouraged US man's suicide online
A British man who encouraged a US citizen to kill themselves while on ...
A British man who encouraged a US citizen to kill themselves while on a video call was jailed for six years and four months.
Dylan Phelan, 21, pleaded guilty to intentionally ...doing an act that was capable of encouraging the suicide of another person.
In October 2024, Travis Dyer, 21, from Louisiana, took his own life during a call between the pair and two other men.
Phelan, from Morley, West Yorkshire, also admitted to three counts of possession of an extreme pornographic image and one count of making an indecent image of a child.
Passing sentence at Leeds Crown Court, the judge, Mr Justice Cotter, admonished him for indulging his “morbid curiosity” at the expense of Dyer’s wellbeing, saying the deceased had needed “help and support but he got the very opposite of that from you”.
He said: “You wanted to feel like you had control over the actions of another. You showed no respect for the life of Travis Dyer.”
This video has been edited to remove descriptions of suicide methods and extreme pornographic material.
Jail for rapist who let innocent man serve 17 years for his crimes
A sex attacker who violently beat and raped a woman in 2003 - in an ...
A sex attacker who violently beat and raped a woman in 2003 - in an attack that led to the wrongful conviction of another man who spent 17 years in ...prison - was given an extended sentence of 24 years.
Paul Quinn, now 52, evaded justice for more than two decades but was found guilty of two counts of rape, one count of choking with intent and one count of grievous bodily harm after new DNA technology linked him to the crime.
The victim, a then-mother-of-two who cannot be named for legal reasons, was walking along Cleggs Lane in Little Hulton, near Salford, in the early hours of 19 July 2003 when she was pushed down an embankment before being was beaten, raped and strangled by Quinn.
After an e-fit based on a description of the attacker was produced by police, Andrew Malkinson was picked out of a digital identity parade by the victim and two other witnesses - despite no DNA evidence linking him to the crime.
Mr Malkinson served 17 years behind bars for a crime he did not commit. Now aged 60, he was only released in 2020 after 17 years in jail, with his conviction finally quashed by the Court of Appeal in 2023.
Quinn always denied any involvement in the attack and was never linked to the crime until 2022 when new evidence emerged. nHe was convicted after a six-week trial at Manchester Crown Court.
During sentencing Mr Justice Bright, described Quinn's victim as a "hero", paying credit to her "quiet dignity" at having to give evidence in two trials.
He added: "She is a remarkable person, and I say all this to give public tribute her, and to others like her.
"They do not come here for vengeance, which we do not give them, they do not come expecting closure, which is a largely mythical phenomenon, especially after an event such as rape, they come because they want the truth to be heard and because they know it is the right thing to do.
"Without them it would not be possible to bring the guilty ones to justice - and this is why she, far above any of the police, or the lawyers or the DNA scientists is the hero of this story."
Turning his attention to Quinn, the judge said he had "seen no sign he has ever repented" for what he had done, adding he had instead "sat back and enjoyed your liberty at the expense of another man".
"Your stance remains that you deny committing the offences, that is by definition not a stance I accept, but it means as you appear before me today you appear apparently without remorse and without regret and you appear to have no readiness to tackle the causes, characteristics and circumstances that led to the offending," he said.
Sentencing him to 21 years in jail, with an extra three years on licence after release, Mr Justice Bright also addressed Quinn on Mr Malkinson's wrongful conviction.
“It is utterly clear that you knew throughout that another man had been arrested, charged, convicted and imprisoned," he told him.
"You knew that his conviction was wrongful. You also knew that it was extremely useful to you. It must have played on your conscience that another man was in prison, in effect, serving your sentence.
"It certainly should have played on your conscience that you were only too willing to sit back and take advantage of his misfortune.
"It is true that you never did anything positive to implicate Mr Malkinson, however but for your offending he never would have been questioned."
Killer who murdered partner and blew up her home jailed for at least 23 years
A killer who murdered his partner before blowing up their home in a ...
A killer who murdered his partner before blowing up their home in a gas explosion was jailed for at least 23 years.
Clifton George, 45, punched and tried to strangle mother-of-two ...Annabel Rook before stabbing her 31 times when she tried to end their 10-year relationship.
The 46-year-old was found dead in the family home in Stoke Newington, north London, in the early hours of 17 June 2025.
George admitted arson but denied murder, claiming he was only guilty of manslaughter because he had lost control. He was convicted of the more serious charge after a trial at Snaresbrook Crown Court.
The trial heard evidence that George was an aggressive and bullying partner who was prone to angry outbursts over trivial matters.
After killing Rook, he started a fire in the basement in order to cause a gas canister explosion which ripped through the house, causing around £400,000 of damage.
Imposing a life sentence with a minimum term of 23 years, Mr Justice Constable said George had the ability to be friendly and fun, but he had "another troubling side" to his character.
"An overwhelming picture has emerged of your rage, anger, and volatility", said the judge, adding that George had a "pronounced temper" which could be sparked by trivial matters and "perceived slights".
This video has been edited to comply with reporting restrictions.
UK Athletics fined £350,000 over death of Paralympian hit by falling metal cage
UK Athletics was fined £350,000 over the "wholly avoidable" death of a ...
UK Athletics was fined £350,000 over the "wholly avoidable" death of a Paralympian who was killed when a shot-put cage collapsed during training.
Abdullah Hayayei, 36, who represented the United Arab ...Emirates, was killed at Newham Leisure Centre, east London, during a practice session in 2017.
The father-of-five was preparing to represent his country in the F34 class discus, javelin and shot put at the World Para Athletics Championships in London when part of a 31st throwing cage fell on him.
He was left with a severe head injury after the 5ft high cage toppled over because it was put up incorrectly and without its base plate, in an "accident waiting to happen".
The national governing body for athletics was charged with causing the death of Mr Hayayei by "supplying for use... a discus/shot put cage which it used and operated without its base structure and which collapsed" into the Paralympian while he was practising shot putting.
UK Athletics Ltd admitted corporate manslaughter and was ordered to pay nearly £400,000 over six years - made up of a fine of £350,000 and legal costs of £44,000, as well as a statutory surcharge.
Keith Davies, who was the head of sport for the 2017 World Para Athletics Championships, also pleaded guilty to a health and safety charge.
The 79-year-old was handed a community order to do 175 hours of unpaid work, to be carried out in the next 12 months.
Sentencing, Judge Richard Marks KC said Mr Hayayei's death was "tragic, untimely and wholly avoidable".
He noted failings by UK Athletics were not a "one-off" but said any financial penalty would "weaken" its ability to support individual athletes and athletics in the community.
He told Davies, a retired PE teacher, that he knew, or ought to have known, base plates were an "integral part" of the cage construction.
He was "on notice" following an earlier collapse of an identical cage, the judge said, adding: "This was an accident which sooner or later was waiting to happen."
In the five years since UK Athletics acquired two identical cages originally used in the 2012 Olympics, they had never been properly assembled with the base plates attached, the court heard.
Davies had claimed UK Athletics had never been supplied with base plates, but this proved not to be true, the court was told.
Annabel Charlotte Darlow KC, born on the 19th March 1970, is a highly respected figure in the British legal system, known for her exceptional advocacy, strategic brilliance, and extensive expertise in complex criminal and civil cases.
As a King’s Counsel (KC) since 2015 and a Recorder of the Crown Court since 2009, Darlow has built an illustrious career marked by high-profile cases, judicial appointments, and recognition as a leading silk in crime by both The Legal 500 and Chambers & Partners.
Annabel Darlow is apparently Security Cleared at the highest level.
Controversy
On the 5th August 2025, Annabel Darlow KC, sitting as a Recorder at Isleworth Crown Court, delivered sentence in a case involving racially aggravated harassment and threats to kill aboard a Virgin Atlantic flight from London Heathrow to Lahore. The defendant, Salman Iftikhar, a 37-year-old recruitment executive, was sentenced to just 15 months in prison for his actions.
Annabel Darlow was called to the Bar (Middle Temple) in 1993 and quickly established herself as a formidable barrister at 6 King’s Bench Walk (6KBW) College Hill, one of the UK’s leading chambers.
Her practice spans a wide range of legal disciplines, with particular emphasis on homicide, terrorism, fraud, corporate advisory, confiscation and asset forfeiture, public and administrative law, and extradition. Her ability to navigate complex legal issues with precision and her reputation as a “forensic pugilist with brains” have earned her widespread acclaim.
Since taking silk in 2015, Darlow has been consistently recognised as a Leading Silk in Crime. The Legal 500 has praised her “understated advocacy style” as “very effective with judges and jurors alike,” while Chambers & Partners has lauded her as “a phenomenal cross-examiner” and “a very strong advocate” who “stands up to judges with confidence and clarity.” Her tactical ability, meticulous preparation, and spellbinding courtroom presence have made her a sought-after barrister for both prosecution and defense in high-stakes cases.
Recorder Annabel Darlow’s caseload reflects her versatility and depth of expertise. She has acted in numerous high-profile cases, many of which have set legal precedents or attracted significant public attention. Below are some highlights of her recent work:
Murder and Violent Crime: Darlow has successfully prosecuted and defended in murder, manslaughter, and attempted murder trials. Notable cases include R v Broughton and others ([2020] EWCA Crim 1093), an appellate case involving a death from a drug overdose at a music festival, and R v TN and others, where she prosecuted nine defendants charged with murder in a revenge attack linked to a county lines drug gang. Her expertise in contested medical and psychiatric evidence has been particularly noted in cases involving issues like diminished responsibility and self-defense.
Terrorism: Darlow has a long history of handling terrorism-related cases, covering groups such as the Provisional IRA, Al Qaeda, ISIS, and right-wing extremists. She prosecuted R v BZ, an Islamic extremist who plotted to behead a British soldier, and R v SW and others, involving right-wing extremists constructing a 3D-printed firearm for terrorist purposes. Her landmark case R v Kahar and others ([2016] EWCA Crim 568) helped establish sentencing guidelines for terrorism trials.
Fraud and Corporate Advisory: Darlow has been involved in major fraud cases, including the Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO) prosecution of Barclays Bank and its senior executives for fraud related to the 2008 financial crisis, described as a “blockbuster” trial. She also handled R v Kallakis and Williams, one of Britain’s largest mortgage fraud cases, and advised corporations like News International and Hewlett Packard/Autonomy in sensitive investigations.
Judicial Review and Human Rights: Darlow regularly acts in judicial review proceedings, including cases involving bail refusals and claims that the criminal courts charge breached defendants’ human rights. Her work in this area demonstrates her commitment to ensuring fairness in the legal process.
The three key values which are central to the role of judicial office holders (JOHs) in England and Wales are: • Independence • Impartiality • Integrity
“Publicity is the very soul of justice. . . . It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial….Where there is no publicity there is no justice”
Her Honour Judge Dean was called to the Bar (Gray’s Inn) in 1994 and began her judicial career as a Deputy District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) in 2006, followed by appointments as a Recorder in 2009 and a Circuit Judge in 2011. She served as Resident Judge at Harrow Crown Court from 2017 before her appointment to Snaresbrook Crown Court in September 2022.
As a senior member of the Inn, this role reflects her significant contributions to the legal profession and the governance of Gray’s Inn, which is one of the four Inns of Court in London.
Modes of Address B.1 – The following judges, when sitting in court, should be addressed as ‘My Lord’ or ‘My Lady’
(b) any Circuit Judge sitting as a judge of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) or the High Court under section 9(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981; (d) any Senior Circuit Judge who is an Honorary Recorder.
Description B.3 – In cause lists, forms and orders members of the judiciary should be described as follows:
(a) Circuit Judges, as ‘His [or Her] Honour Judge A’. When the judge is sitting as a judge of the High Court under section 9(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the words ‘sitting as a judge of the High Court’ should be added;
HHJ Dean covers the area around Snaresbrook Crown Court. She has also supported diversity efforts, such as assisting with visits from Diversity and Community Relations Magistrates at Harrow Crown Court. Additionally, her participation in events like the London Law Collective, where she delivered a keynote speech, highlights her role in inspiring diversity in the legal profession.
Diversity and Community Relations Judges across England and Wales undertake a huge amount of community engagement in a voluntary capacity. They also seek to encourage legal professionals from under-represented groups to consider a judicial career.
The three key values which are central to the role of judicial office holders (JOHs) in England and Wales are: • Independence • Impartiality • Integrity
“Publicity is the very soul of justice. . . . It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial….Where there is no publicity there is no justice”
The software – known variously as Judicial Case Manager, MyHMCTS or CCD – is used to manage evidence and track cases before the courts. It is used by judges, lawyers, case workers and members of the public.
A leaked internal report revealed that a software flaw, present for several years before its discovery in 2023, caused critical evidence to go missing, be overwritten, or appear lost in civil, family, and tribunal courts.
This issue, which potentially affected thousands of cases, has led to accusations that HMCTS failed to act promptly or transparently, leaving judges to make rulings based on incomplete evidence. The scandal has drawn sharp criticism from legal experts and raised fears of widespread miscarriages of justice, particularly in sensitive family court cases involving child protection.
A briefing prepared for the chief executive of HMCTS (Nick Goodwin)- dated March 2024 – reveals the risk to proceedings was initially categorised as “high” with the possibility of court outcomes being adversely affected assessed as “very likely”, resulting in “severe reputational impact to HMCTS“.
Specific details about the development team or external contractors involved in the the case-management software, referred to as Judicial Case Manager, MyHMCTS, or Common Components Division (CCD)are not publicly disclosed or available.
One alarming instance highlighted in the report involved over 4,000 documents vanishing from hundreds of public family law cases, including those related to child protection.
The failure to disclose the issue has fuelled allegations of a deliberate cover-up, with one HMCTS source stating, “There is a culture of cover-ups. They’re not worried about risk to the public, they’re worried about people finding out about the risk to the public.”
The internal report, obtained by the BBC, revealed that HMCTS did not conduct a comprehensive investigation into the extent of the data corruption or its impact on case outcomes.
Of the 609 cases identified with potential issues, only 109 were selected for further review, with just one deemed to have a “potentially significant impact.”
Critics, including Sir James Munby, former President of the Family Division, have called the incident “shocking” and “a scandal,” arguing that the lack of a thorough investigation undermines trust in the judicial system. Munby emphasised that the absence of a formal legal review of affected cases makes it impossible to confidently assert that no miscarriages of justice occurred.
The software’s flawed design has also come under scrutiny. Sources described it as “not designed properly or robustly,” with a history of data loss that was inadequately addressed. This has led to broader concerns about the reliability of digital systems in critical public services.
HMCTS has since stated that the IT bug was fixed in 2023, though specific details about the timeline of the fix or the measures taken to prevent future issues remain sparse. HMCTS maintains that its internal investigation found no significant impact on case outcomes, but this claim has been met with scepticism due to the limited scope of the review.
Families and individuals affected by the data loss may face significant challenges in seeking justice. Researching Reform, a legal advocacy group, noted that many families had previously complained about missing evidence in their cases, suggesting that the IT bug may have contributed to wrongful rulings. As calls grow for a formal inquiry, the HMCTS scandal serves as a stark reminder of the need for transparency, accountability, and robust technological systems in the administration of justice.
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